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ABSTRACT 
 Insider threats are a serious problem in all organizations and continue to be an 
issue despite technological advances. Insider threats can undermine cybersecurity by 
subverting controls or exploiting weak systems. These subversions can be enabled by an 
inadequate security policy, poor policy implementation, or new attack innovations. This 
thesis identifies the tactics that can be used by an intentional insider threat to subvert 
policies, and examines whether sufficiently reliable tools and policies are available to 
prevent and detect this type of behavior. We conclude with policy and technical control 
recommendations. 
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A. THE PROBLEM 
Much study and investment in protecting networks from outside threats have been 
made; however, many attacks are launched from within an organization’s network (“insider 
threats”). Such cases have steadily risen over the last several years. Insider threats can be 
caused by user negligence or intentional malicious actions. An intentional insider threat is 
defined by the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) as 
the threat presented by a person who has, or once had, authorized access to 
information, facilities, networks, people, or resources; and who wittingly, 
or unwittingly, commits: acts in contravention of law or policy that resulted 
in, or might result in, harm through the loss or degradation of government 
or company information, resources, or capabilities; or destructive acts. 
(Alba, 2015, para. 3) 
This thesis focuses on intentional malicious actions involving people knowingly 
trying to curtail security policies and tools to harm an organization or gain personally. 
While most insider threats are due to user negligence, the cost to an organization is highest 
for intentional insider threats (IBM Security, 2020). In 2020, a report showed that of 204 
organizations that had insider-threat activity—63% were due to negligence and 23% were 
due to criminal insiders. However, the estimated annualized cost for incidents due to 
negligence was $4.58 million, while the cost for criminal insiders was $4.08 million. While 
the amount of insider-threat activity is debated, the damage of even one incident can be 
high in sensitive domains when it involves proprietary information, classified information, 
or private personal information. 
B. RESEARCH GOALS 
The primary goal of this thesis is to determine if the continued issue with insider 
threats is due to problems with security implementation, security-policy adoption, or 
insufficient security policies. From reviewing current literature and studies, 
recommendations are formulated to deter or detect intentional insider threats. These 
recommendations are based on some new studies. Consolidating both past and current 
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efforts to address insider-threat detection methods will allow future work on insider-threat 
detection methods to be efficiently selected. Also, these recommendations aim to focus 
attention on the most vulnerable areas for improvement. 
This thesis proposes a method that is focused on denial then detection. In particular, 
focusing on deterrence first will raise the barrier for intentional insider threats that lack the 
technical capability to circumvent a system and reduces the number of insider-threat 
attacks of opportunity. Policies and automated tools must be in place to detect insider 
threats exploiting administrator or privileged access. We hope to show the importance of 
investing in strategies and tools that work on fixing these threats. 
C. OTHER CHAPTERS 
Chapter II will explore previous methods for handling intentional insider threats 
and their effectiveness in deterring or detecting them. The chapter will examine tools such 
as network-traffic analysis, user-behavior analytics, and privilege-access management. 
Chapter III will explore the categories of insider threats and their motivations, including 
the most common methods used. Chapter IV will study the observed effectiveness of 
deterring or detecting intentional insider-threat activity and discussions of ethical or legal 
implications. Chapter V will recommend related methods and policies to improve an 
organization’s security. Chapter VI will give conclusions and recommendations for future 
work. 
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II. PREVIOUS WORK 
A. WHAT ENABLES AN INSIDER THREAT? 
Many studies have been done on how outside attackers infiltrate protected 
networks. However in recent years, more focus has been given to protecting a network 
from inside an organization’s protected walls. One important issue is what enables an 
insider threat in the first place. This involves three features: motive, opportunity, and 
capability. 
1. Motive 
Since insider threats often engage in criminal activities, it helps to consider what 
can motivate someone to commit a crime. Financial issues, foreign influences, and 
disgruntlement could motivate someone to become an insider threat. One study identified 
four categories of motivations: predisposition to malicious behavior, mental disorders, 
personality factors, and current emotional state (Gheyas & Abdallah, 2016). A 
predisposition to malicious behavior can be challenging to detect as it requires an insider 
to try to execute a malicious behavior. Some studies have used honeypots on an internal 
network to see if insiders attack them as an indicator of insider activity (Spitzner, 2003; 
Levine et al., 2003). Mental disorders such as depression, paranoia, and schizophrenia can 
create a higher risk of an individual becoming an insider threat. Personality factors and 
current emotional states are the two areas often brought up in the discussion of insider-
threat detection (Schultz, 2002). Potential insider threats observed had a “history of 
managing crises ineffectively, pattern of frustration, sense of inadequacy, aggrandized 
view of their abilities and achievements, a strong sense of entitlement, views self above the 
rules, and actions that seek immediate gratification.” (Gelles, 2016, p. 9). Relevant 
emotional states can be an increased hostility, intolerance of criticism, inability to take 




A crime cannot be committed without an opportunity. This opportunity can occur 
due to an insider’s role within an organization, such as being a system administrator, or 
due to the improper creation, implementation, or enforcement of security controls. 
A malicious insider can cause more harm with more unfettered access to a system. 
This potential becomes greater with insufficient controls such as auditing system logs, 
insufficient application of the principle of least privilege, and resiliency measures to ensure 
no single point of failure. Opportunity is another way to say how easy it is to commit a 
crime. Having inadequate security policies or unenforced policies can allow an insider to 
exfiltrate data or install malicious software easily. Combining technical security controls 
and enforcement of security policies reduces an insider threat’s potential to attack 
successfully. 
3. Capability 
When security controls are adequate, an insider threat’s technical abilities must 
increase to subvert them. Sophisticated insider threats have the technical know-how to 
perform advanced techniques and cover their tracks without detection by auditing systems. 
Also, if the sophisticated attacker knows how the detection schemes work, they can tailor 
their actions to circumvent them. The most dangerous insider threats have both the 
capability and the opportunity to commit a crime, such as a system administrator with little 
supervisory oversight, no separation of duties, and who is the single point of failure within 
the organization.  
B. TYPES OF INSIDER THREAT ACTIONS 
Insider threats can harm an organization in three main ways: sabotage, theft, and 
fraud (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 2018). The deliberate destruction, damage, 
or obstruction of information-technology infrastructure can be costly for an organization. 
Information-technology sabotage examples range from system administrators who refused 
to reveal administrator passwords, installing backdoors to connect remotely into servers 
and shutting them down, and deletion of critical data (CERT Insider Threat Center, 2010). 
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While employees in any position can commit information-technology sabotage, system 
administrators can do the most damage and are the most common perpetrators of this type 
of crime. 
When an employee develops code for an application for their previous employer, 
they may mistakenly think they own the code. Policies and laws differ between 
organizations about whether the employee has the right to their work to show future 
employers. Some organizations consider this as theft of the organization’s intellectual 
property. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines intellectual property theft as stealing 
ideas, inventions, or creative expressions from people or companies. Some examples are 
trade secrets, proprietary information, or parts of a movie or music. An example of this 
type of behavior is an insider committing industrial espionage for a competing company 
by stealing proprietary information. 
Fraud can be defined as the wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in 
financial or personal gain. Insider threats commit fraud to “steal because of a sense of 
entitlement, and some who want to exact revenge against an organization simply because 
they are angry” (CERT Insider Threat Center, 2010, para. 1). Fraud can be creating a 
fictitious employee or vendor who gets paid by an organization, altering payroll data, using 
personal information for identity theft, and misuse of corporate credit cards. Fraud can be 
committed in many ways, and in 2012, Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CMU-CERT) found that 71 percent of insider frauds were 
through non-technical means (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 2012). 
C. CURRENT METHODS TO DETECT INSIDER THREATS 
As technology advances, so have the methods and tools to protect organizations 
and their information from misuse. In the last five years, advancements in artificial 
intelligence and machine learning have been integrated into insider-threat programs, tools, 
and policies.  
A survey of 204 organizations and 964 people not associated with military 
organizations that have experienced insider-threat events reported their security measures 
included user training, data-loss prevention, user-behavior analytics, employee monitoring, 
6 
security-incident and event management, incident-response management, third-party 
vetting procedures, threat-intelligence sharing, privileged-access management, and 
network-traffic intelligence (IBM Security, 2020). Table 1 shows the observed frequencies 
of these methods to be explored in the following sections. While more technical means can 
subvert systems that protect organizational networks, such as using covert channels to 
exfiltrate data, we will only consider the more obvious ways. 
Table 1. Tools and Activities That Reduce Insider Threats. Source: 
IBM Security (2020).  
Security tools & activities Frequency of companies 
Percentage of 
companies 
User training & awareness 112 55% 
Data loss prevention 110 54% 
User behavior analytics 102 50% 
Employee monitoring & surveillance 96 47% 
Security incident & event management 91 45% 
Incident response management 89 44% 
Strict third-party vetting procedures 87 43% 
Threat intelligence sharing 85 42% 
Privileged access management 80 39% 
Network traffic intelligence 77 38% 
 
1. User Training and Awareness 
User training and awareness help any security policy. It can reduce both intentional 
and unintentional insider-threat incidents. While user training is well suited for preventing 
users from becoming unintentional insiders, it also helps by recognizing and reporting 
suspicious behavior. DOD insider-threat training reviews spotting suspicious behavior and 
uses case studies to provide real examples of this suspicious behavior. However, this is a 
passive form of security-awareness training. More active methods for training include 
phishing campaigns done internally to test an organization’s staff (Intelligence and 
National Security Alliance, 2019). 
Insider-threat training programs should depend on position within the organization. 
Leadership should know about the impacts that insiders can cause and the importance of 
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reinforcing security policies. General staff should also know how to report indicators of 
suspicious activity and measures to protect against becoming an unintentional insider 
threat. Insider-threat training should not associate malicious insiders with only well-known 
attributes such as social isolation. It should include employees bragging about how much 
damage they could do to the organization, downloading data before termination, using 
company resources for their own business, or trying to access other employees’ accounts 
by social engineering (Collins et al., 2016). 
While it is difficult to quantify user awareness in preventing or detecting insider 
threats, it is essential to any security policy. However, these programs cannot guarantee to 
discourage insiders from committing crimes. Intentional insider behavior often involves 
disgruntlement, and user training does not help stop this (Gelles, 2016). Moreover, relying 
upon other employees to report suspicious behaviors is difficult without a private or 
anonymous way to do so (Collins et al., 2016). 
2. Data-Loss Prevention 
The second most used mitigation is data-loss prevention (IBM Security, 2020). 
These are tools and techniques for protecting sensitive data from being deleted, accessed 
by unapproved users, or exfiltrated. These methods are commonly used to comply with 
regulations such as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS), or General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). They have components of critical-data identification, leak detection, 
protection of data at rest, protection of data in use, and protection of data in motion. 
Critical-data identification is usually done by rules such as those for identifying 
credit-card or Social Security numbers. Most commercial data-loss prevention solutions 
offer regular expression to detect such data and address compliance standards 
automatically. Other tools can determine a document’s privacy classification from a 
training set of correctly classified documents and materials. This can be done using regular 
expressions, keywords, and hashing (Hart et al., 2011). 
Data-loss protection of data at rest is done by encryption and access control. Private 
information should be encrypted when stored on servers and endpoints. Additional 
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protection can be provided by scanning to determine if sensitive data is in the wrong 
location. For data in use, some methods try to establish typical use patterns for users; others 
prohibit certain activities with the data, such as copying and pasting, printing, and screen 
capturing (Shabtai et al., 2012). For data in transit, other products detect and inspect data 
flows for suspicious activity on protocols such as email and Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP). Some solutions do more detailed analysis by packet inspection. 
Data-loss prevention has several weaknesses. One weakness is the reliance on 
automated methods on training data, where they may incorrectly classify newer proprietary 
information as non-critical when it should be classified as critical. Another issue is how 
easily the classification system can be tricked by replacing keywords or paraphrasing 
information to bypass filters (Shabtai et al., 2012). Machine learning can improve 
classification accuracy but works best in controlled environments such as a virtual machine 
(Kongsgård et al., 2016). Hash-based data-loss prevention systems can be tricked by 
replacing a single character to change the hash. Another weakness is the inability to read 
encrypted data. An organization can block all encrypted files from leaving the organization, 
but this could violate privacy policies and could hurt worker productivity, especially in 
health care and finance. Lastly, one survey showed the inability of automated systems to 
correlate a user completing a prohibited action (such as emailing a marked document) and 
a subsequent allowed action such as printing the document. 
In summary, data-loss prevention can combat confidential information loss but is 
prone to error and requires careful configuration. The current tools are insufficient to 
combat a malicious insider threat and should be combined with other techniques such as 
user-behavior analytics and access controls. 
3. User-Activity Profiling 
User-activity profiling is a subset of user-and-entity behavior analytics (UEBA). 
This includes monitoring other entities such as unmanaged endpoints and cloud 
applications. User-activity profiling can be user-based or role-based. 
User-based profiling identifies abnormal behavior of a user by comparing their 
actions to a baseline, looking for changes beyond some threshold that would require 
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investigation (Dean & Rowe, 2018). Machine-learning methods set a threshold during a 
training period that learns to identify normal behavior for each user. Once numeric values 
are more than a specified number of standard deviations outside this threshold, or if 
predefined suspicious actions are taken, such as deleting log files, an alert would be 
triggered for that user (Legg et al., 2017). This can work if malicious behavior occurs only 
rarely in an organization. However, this method can generate false positives through errors 
during training or for anomalous non-malicious changes in behavior (Dean, 2017). 
User-activity profiling can be made more accurate by a role-based grouping of user 
behaviors rather than job titles. Users who perform the same tasks should act similarly, and 
behavior grouping will address people that perform multiple job roles within an 
organization. However, grouping by job title helps for new users with little historical data, 
and it may be better to group users by behavioral patterns instead of roles (Dean, 2017). 
These detection schemes are useful if a malicious insider tries to do unauthorized 
actions such as escalating privileges or tries to access a sensitive folder. However, they are 
less successful at detecting legitimate actions that are misused, such as a user printing a 
much larger volume of documents than previously or compared to their peers. Handling 
such cases requires setting acceptable levels of false positives. Many algorithms have been 
suggested with false-positive rates between .01% to 54% depending on the data’s training 
and which type of anomalous behavior was trying to be detected (Azaria et al., 2014). 
However, it is unclear if any available tool uses these algorithms since vendors withhold 
that information. 
User-activity profiling was used by 50% of the companies surveyed in a recent 
report, although detection methods were unclear (IBM Security, 2020). Many tools 
perform “user baselining” but do not indicate what factors contribute to a threat score. 
Nonetheless, commercial products provide many features such as security-incident and 
event-management integration, malware detection and prevention, additional monitoring 
for privileged users, and forensic tools. 
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4. Alerting Tools 
Security-incident and event management, incident-response management, and 
vetting procedures are used with the other tools to prevent, detect, or respond to possible 
insider-threat incidents. All three were used by over 40% of the companies surveyed. 
Security-incident and event management tools aggregate security data from 
multiple sources to act as an alert system for security incidents. It can integrate with 
firewalls, network-traffic analysis, workstation-log information, intrusion-detection 
systems, antivirus software, and some user-activity profiling software. Security-incident 
and event-management tools issue alerts based on configured rules. They can detect 
security violations such as excessive file copying, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attacks, and brute-force attacks. They can enforce HIPAA, GDPR, and other regulatory 
laws and can be used to investigate incidents. However, they have some of the same issues 
that the previously mentioned tools have, as they require careful calibration to avoid 
excessive false positives. Depending on the rules, security-incident and event management 
can trigger automated responses such as locking accounts or turning off a workstation, but 
doing this too often hurts productivity. Another issue is that many solutions do not prevent 
actions from happening but only alert once the action has already occurred. Also, many 
insider threats act within the organization’s security parameters, and rules may not detect 
such actions. 
Incident-response tools can also help with insider threats. These tools can analyze 
log files of the host where the incident occurred, create after-action reports, and patch 
vulnerable systems. Some organizations maintain dedicated incident response teams, while 
others form task forces once an incident has been detected (Ahmad et al., 2012). Proper 
expertise in investigating the cause of an incident is important to prevent missed issues. 
Good incident response should include root-cause analysis, and lessons learned should be 
reported outside of the incident-response team. This study also showed that much more 
attention was given to high-impact incidents, but the lower-impact incidents should also be 
analyzed to find the root causes that could be more serious. 
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Third-party vetting was another tool used by many companies for reducing insider 
threats by examining something or someone carefully to determine suitability. In a 2019 
survey of 107 organizations, the three most common methods for pre-employment vetting 
were employment verification, federal criminal court-record screening, and state and local 
court-record screening (George et al., 2019). Other sources of vetting found are shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Processes for Pre-Employment Vetting. Adapted from 
George et al. (2019). 
 Process Used 
1 Employment and work history verification 
2 Federal criminal-court record screening 
3 State and local criminal-court screening 
4 E-Verify screening 
5 Credit checks 
6 Education verification 
7 Professional references 
8 Personal-address history verification 
9 Fingerprint background checks 
10 Personal references 
11 Military-history verification 
12 Civil-court record screening 
13 Sexual-offender screening 
14 Drug screening 
15 Licensure, certification, registration verification 
16 Driving-history screening 
17 Regulatory-sanctions screening 
18 Social-media screening and open-source research 
19 International background screening 
20 Other 
 
Vetting can also be done when awarding contracts. Many regulatory organizations 
maintain lists to include blacklisted companies and people based on previous vetting or 
reports of misconduct. Sources of such lists are the Excluded Parties List, the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. Customs, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
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State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations, the Food and Drug Administration, 
and the World Bank (Appel, 2017). 
While it is common to vet incoming personnel, few organizations do a continuous 
evaluation (George et al., 2019). This is an issue with malicious insider threats as many, 
such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, had previously cleared background 
investigations. The RAND Corporation recommends a robust continuous evaluation 
program (Luckey et al., 2019). Both CERT and RAND recommended mandatory 
behavioral monitoring of people who were either terminated, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
for a minimum of 30 days both before and after an employee has left the organization as 
many incidents occur then (Collins et al., 2016; Luckey et al., 2019). A weakness of the 
traditional vetting process is the lack of inspection of online activities (Appel, 2017). This 
can cause an incomplete assessment of potential employees to identify behavioral 
indicators that could indicate a reason for distrust. 
5. Privileged-Access Management 
Privileged-access management, also called privileged-access security or privileged-
identity management, is grounded in the principle of least privilege. This is the concept of 
giving an individual only the minimum rights and privileges necessary to complete their 
work. Ways to implement privileged-access management include role-based rights, 
segregation of duties, and reliable employee termination procedures. Role-based rights 
restrict users further to only what is necessary to complete a role in their jobs. This can 
limit the amount of damage a malicious insider could do (Collins et al., 2016). For example, 
a Human Resources employee should not need access to files in the Sales department. 
One potential problem is “privileged-access” creep, where users gain additional 
access rights over time that are not revoked when no longer needed, such as after a 
departmental transfer or promotion; audits must be done regularly. Also, using role-based 
access rights can be challenging to configure when an employee has multiple roles, which 
is typical in smaller organizations (Collins et al., 2016). Role-based access also does not 
address the misuse of legitimate access as by the many insiders in technical positions who 
have committed information-technology sabotage. Lastly, role-based access privileges can 
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impede organizational productivity. If users are given only the minimum amount of access 
usually required, it may be too cumbersome to gain the new access needed to do their jobs 
well. Furthermore, users may be encouraged to find ways around security controls (Stolfo 
et al., 2008). 
A related principle is the segregation of duties, which disallows any one person 
from making critical changes to a system or being responsible for monitoring it. Two or 
more people should be required to sign off on significant changes to critical systems, do 
backups, and make major system changes (Collins et al., 2016). This reduces the chance of 
sabotage or theft; many of the most damaging incidents involved an insider who was an 
organization’s sole system administrator. Another method is to give system administrators 
two segregated accounts, a “superuser” account to make essential changes and a standard 
user account for other day-to-day activities. This reduces the likelihood of mistaken 
changes and the amount of log data required to review if an incident occurred. 
Limiting access rights on digital systems is especially important for terminated-
employee accounts. A frequent recommendation is to monitor an account for 30 days, both 
before and after termination. This prevents an ex-employee from using remote-access tools 
to infiltrate and attack an organization after termination (Collins et al., 2016). While most 
issues with privileged-access management are tied to the configuration of a system, 
commercial services can address maintenance. They provide solutions for onboarding, 
auto-discovery for tracking privileged accounts, automated temporary access, and 
customized reporting. 
6. Network Traffic Analysis to Detect Anomalies 
Network-traffic analysis was only used by 38% of the companies surveyed. It can 
help identify anomalous behavior and identify critical assets related to insider threats. 
Anomalous behavior in network traffic can be abnormal traffic spikes, unusual login times, 
or unverified remote-access sessions. Insider-threat activity that can be identified includes 
accessing sensitive files, email patterns, Web browsing, excessive downloads, and 
suspicious software installations (Collins et al., 2016). Email is important as most insiders 
perpetrating theft use email to exfiltrate data (Moore et al., 2012). However, it may be 
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impossible with encrypted traffic, which conceals some actions from detection. It also can 
be incorrect to attribute activity to a user if an insider used their account. Lastly, as with all 
anomaly-based systems, an accurate baseline and thresholds must be established. Logs of 
all network activity will not protect an organization very well from malicious insider 
activity. However, network traffic analysis can identify an organization’s most often used 
services, databases, and servers for reducing the damage a malicious insider can achieve 
(Collins et al., 2016). Identifying critical assets is essential to creating effective risk-
management policies. 
7. Threat Intelligence Sharing 
Sharing of threat intelligence, and specifically, insider-threat intelligence, can aid 
other organizations in increasing their security. Many organizations and groups issue such 
information, such as the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the 
Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST), and the Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APWG) (Cichonski et al., 2012). These groups provide 
information to response teams and security professionals about real-world cyber threats. 
However, this information is focused more on outside threats to an organization 
than insider threats. Insider threat intelligence sharing was used by 42% of companies 
surveyed, but it is unclear how much of that was about negligent insiders instead of 
malicious ones. Another obstacle to threat-intelligence sharing is the reluctance of 
companies to share information that may harm their reputation, and an insider breach or 
intellectual-property theft could do that (Wagner et al., 2019). While the Federal 
Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) requires reporting to a centralized 
authority all incidents in government organizations, private organizations have no such 
requirements (Cichonski et al., 2012). 
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III. TYPES OF INSIDER THREATS 
Intentional insider threats come in many forms with different names. Each name 
categorizes insider threats based on their motivation. In this chapter, we will examine the 
categories of insider threats and the most common methods for theft, fraud, and sabotage 
of information technology systems. While workplace violence has been called an insider 
threat, we will not discuss here threats that are primarily physical. 
A. CATEGORIES OF INSIDER THREATS 
Insider threats can be categorized into four types based on motive: malicious, 
vengeful, virtuous, and wicked (Thompson, 2019). These categories apply to both 
intentional and unintentional insider threats. Intentional insider threats tend to be vengeful 
or malicious. 
A malicious insider threat engages in deliberate destructive behavior (Thompson, 
2019). Malicious insiders typically do sabotage and theft. The most common motivation 
suggested in the literature is a disgruntled employee. No distinct psychological profile 
automatically makes someone disgruntled. However, some personality characteristics 
increase risks, such as a strong sense of entitlement, a pattern of frustration, 
disappointment, and a sense of inadequacy (Gelles, 2016). These can occur for several 
reasons, such as being passed up for promotion or a lack of recognition. A way to reduce 
disgruntlement is to reduce the feelings of unmet expectations through clear 
communication from leadership and consistent enforcement of clear policies. Consistent 
enforcement will reduce the chance that employees feel that they are treated differently, or 
that management is held to a different standard. 
The vengeful insider “willfully acts out against supervisor or co-workers and 
believes in the greater good of the organization/system” (Thompson, 2019) and desires to 
harm the organization knowingly. An example of vengeful insider behavior would be 
ignoring prescribed security practices to cause trouble for their supervisor. A vengeful 
insider can become malicious after becoming increasingly disgruntled or after seeing their 
actions significantly affect the organization. Both vengeful and malicious insiders are 
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prime targets for foreign or competitor influence, as when a foreign agent sees an employee 
negatively speaking about their employer on social media. 
The virtuous insider is a well-intentioned employee that places an organization at 
risk through their behavior. An example is an employee who tries to meet deadlines by 
taking documents home and leaving them unprotected. This type of threat can be reduced 
through user training and awareness. 
The wicked insider is like the virtuous insider, except this employee knows they 
are deliberately breaking policies to get the job done while still appearing to be well-
intentioned. A wicked insider can also disregard security rules for self-interest by copying 
inventory reports from previous weeks to go home earlier. A wicked insider still may not 
know the full extent of the risk they are putting on the organization. This type of threat 
would be considered unintentional since the intent to harm the organization is absent. 
B. OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR INTENTIONAL INSIDER THREATS 
Other factors that can cause an employee to become a malicious insider threat are 
financial gain, foreign influence, or ideological differences. An insider can exploit access 
to a system for their financial gain through fraud and intellectual property theft. Fraud is 
when an insider incorrectly changes an organization’s data or steals information for identity 
theft for personal gain. Theft of intellectual property is when an insider takes confidential 
information from a business for personal gains, such as selling it to a competitor or as a 
condition for new employment. According to Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CMU-CERT), the sector most affected by fraud is the 
financial, followed by healthcare and governments (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 
2018). Indicators that an employee could be an insider threat due to financial motivation 
are defaulting on a loan, a high debt-to-income ratio, a current or previous gambling 
problem, or greed (CDSE, 2019). Other indicators that an employee has committed fraud 
or intellectual property theft would be sudden changes in their financial situation, such as 
expensive purchases or unexplained affluence. 
Financial issues can also make people open to influence from foreign adversaries. 
Some insider threats became spies for money, coercion, ideology, ego, disgruntlement, 
17 
ingratiation, or thrills (Charney & Irvin, 2016). This influence can be coerced through 
concern over family members’ safety in another place or foreign country. Private 
businesses can be susceptible to malicious insiders who commit theft by performing 
economic espionage for business competitors for money or because they are disgruntled. 
Ideological threats occur when beliefs or philosophies from a group or person contradict 
the organization they serve. These threats can occur from disagreements with an aspect of 
an organization’s function, such as subscribing to Communism while serving in a 
democratic organization (Charney & Irvin, 2016). However, it can be uncertain if an insider 
commits the crime due to their belief in that ideology or uses it to justify their actions. 
C. METHODS USED BY INSIDER THREATS 
Insider threats usually achieve goals of theft or fraud by exfiltrating data. 
Information technology sabotage is most commonly done through destructive changes. 
1. Exfiltration Methods for Theft or Fraud 
Most insider crimes reported were by non-technical means (CERT Software 
Engineering Institute, 2012). Advanced techniques, such as using covert channels to avoid 
detection, are rare. The main methods reported were sending data by email, printing, 
faxing, smartphones, universal serial bus (USB) storage devices, and cloud storage. 
Email is the most common way to forward stolen information (Gelles, 2016). 
Exfiltrating data by sending emails to personal accounts or accessing Web-based email 
services like Gmail from within an organization’s network has occurred in many case 
studies (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 2012, 2018). Data has also been exfiltrated 
directly by sending it to people outside an organization. Confidential information can also 
be printed and carried out of the organization. Regular audits of the print server help detect 
this. 
Faxing or scanning documents also enables exfiltrating them to a remote site 
(Collins et al., 2016). Smartphones can take pictures of confidential documents, record 
sensitive conversations, and provide a mass storage device. Smartphones can then send 
data to a cloud server, personal email account, or a text messaging site using cellular data 
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services outside the monitoring of organizational networks. Smartphones can introduce 
other threats, such as by connecting to otherwise isolated (air-gapped) devices to access 
remotely. Removable media such as CDs, DVDs, or USB storage devices can allow an 
insider to record much more data than paper. These devices are also easier to conceal than 
paper and allow data to be transferred to personal computers or people. Lastly, exfiltrated 
information stored in the cloud can be accessed from anywhere and with less likelihood of 
their actions being observed by other employees. 
2. Information Technology Sabotage 
Information-technology sabotage requires more technical knowledge and 
sophistication than exfiltration. In many cases, an insider threat that committed the 
sabotage was a system administrator that had privileged access to systems and used it to 
degrade or destroy them (CERT Insider Threat Center, 2010; CERT Software Engineering 
Institute, 2018; Collins et al., 2016). They used technical means such as backdoor 
installations or logic bombs that made a system inoperable once triggered or at some future 
date. They also did mass file deletion or refused to provide administrator passwords. 
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IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF DETERRENCE AND DETECTION OF 
INSIDER THREATS 
Can some insider threats be deterred from acting? Studies show that deterrence can 
help security-policy compliance and encourage the proper use of information systems. In 
this chapter, we will examine the overall effectiveness of deterrence, threat profiling, and 
added controls on digital data in controlling insider threats. 
Not much real-world data on insider threats and their methods is available, though 
there is some synthetic data we will discuss in Chapter 5. This limits the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of tools discussed in Chapter 2. However, tool effectiveness can be discussed 
based on increasing the cost to the insider and reducing the risk to the organization. 
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF DETERRENCE 
Deterrence is the idea that people can be discouraged from an illegal activity if the 
likelihood of being caught and its cost outweighs the benefits of committing the crime. 
Deterring an insider threat is complex as it must consider different motivations such as 
greed, revenge, and other gains. The overall effectiveness of deterrence has been debated 
in various studies; however, for security policy compliance, some work has empirically 
measured deterrence effects (Albrechtsen, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009; Pratt et al., 2017). 
These studies found that a big factor in deterrence is the perception by the insider that they 
would likely be caught. However, these studies do not generally consider individual factors 
such as self-control or personality. Also, an intentional insider threat is harder to deter as 
their motivation for committing crimes increases. The likelihood of detection may be 
judged low by some insider threats like system administrators who have expert knowledge 
of the system investigated. Despite these challenges, some deterrence effects can be 
accomplished when insiders know good tools are present that will detect them and deterring 
even a few insider threat incidents reduces the workload on investigators and reduces 
organizational risk. 
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B. DETERRENCE AND TECHNICAL CONTROLS FOR INSIDER THREATS 
BASED ON MOTIVATION 
Consistent enforcement of security policies is important for deterrence or detection 
to work. Ideally, other employees should see enforcement, such as being discussed at 
departmental meetings and being consistently enforced despite the employee’s position. 
Some studies suggest that making the computer- security team more visible through 
interactive training makes people more likely to comply with security policies 
(Albrechtsen, 2007). Consistent enforcement is a prerequisite for both deterrence and 
detection to increase the insider’s perception of the likelihood of being caught. A second 
issue with deterrence is that people are less likely to follow security policies when they 
think they will decrease their efficiency. If managers and other employees do not report 
security violations, this weakens deterrence by reducing the likelihood of being caught 
further. The reduction in efficiency will also affect detection if the tools and methods 
recommended require significant work from investigators. Lastly, increasing the severity 
of punishment is largely ineffective at deterring unwanted behaviors (Herath & Rao, 2009). 
Therefore, the effectiveness of deterrence depends mostly on the likelihood of an insider 
threat being caught. 
1. Deterring Financial Gain Motivations 
Insider threats motivated by financial gain can be deterred and detected more easily 
than other types discussed later. To deter an insider threat that is motivated by money, the 
insider must believe the risks of being caught outweigh the potential monetary gain. This 
can be aided by telling employees of monitoring and detection efforts made by the 
organization, which can positively affect an employee’s likelihood of complying with 
security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009). However, this tends to deter more those insiders 
who commit acts based on opportunity rather than those in significant debt. Also, little 
work has considered the tradeoff between the cost and the potential gain for insider 
continuing the illicit activity. For these insiders, the potential gain can also be reduced by 
better detection or increasing the act’s difficulty. More regular or randomized audits could 
increase the detection rate, and most instances of fraud have been found through audits 
(CERT Software Engineering Institute, 2018). Often clever insiders make small changes 
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over many months to avoid immediate detection, which is called a “low and slow” 
approach (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 2012). Increasing the rate of audits 
increases the likelihood of detecting suspicious activity and lowers the potential damage, 
such as the amount that could be stolen or fraudulently charged. 
Other monitoring methods have been proposed, such as the Behavioral Analysis of 
Insider Threat (BAIT) framework to identify malicious insiders trying to exfiltrate data for 
crimes such as identity theft (Azaria et al., 2014). However, this method uses semi-
supervised learning and requires labeled malicious insider data, and it cannot identify new 
attack methods. Other methods that have been proposed have either weak results, such as 
a precision of only 42%, or have a high probability of overfitting for the most popular 
synthetic dataset provided by CMU-CERT. Machine learning techniques with deep neural 
networks show better promise. 
2. Deterring Foreign Influence and Espionage 
Foreign influence or espionage is difficult to deter since the motivator could be 
money, coercion, ideology, disgruntlement, ingratiation, or thrills (Charney & Irvin, 2016). 
Usually, insider threats that are spies provide information for a foreign handler. Their only 
deterrence would be that they could be caught. However, many believe they are too smart 
to be caught or fall into a “gambler’s fallacy” where they would be very unlucky to be 
caught more than once (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003). This resetting effect could be strongest 
in crimes like low-impact data exfiltration, where an insider threat could be caught and 
counseled against breaking a security policy. Another issue with foreign influence or 
espionage is that the insider can become trapped after providing information once and is 
coerced or blackmailed into continuing to provide information (Charney, 2010). Detecting 
these insiders requires user-behavior monitoring from logs that record how many times a 
file has been read, copied, printed, or downloaded. Other useful tools could be Web-site 
monitoring to see if users are visiting extremist sites, booking foreign travel, trying to 
escalate their privileges, or doing social engineering of co-workers. For Web site 
monitoring, natural-language processing could discern a page’s topic instead of only 
looking at the site name. 
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3. Deterring the Ideologically Motivated 
Ideological threats are harder to deter; they involve conflicts between personally 
held beliefs and those of the organization. The best countermeasures are safeguards to 
minimize the damage that this threat could cause. An intentional insider threat motivated 
by their ideology would more likely commit vengeful acts such as sabotage over fraud. 
Extensive access controls, mandatory multi-person checks on critical system changes, and 
proper separation of duties are needed for this kind of threat since most information-
technology sabotage involves a sole system administrator of an organization. This means 
requiring at least two people to approve major system updates; ideally, the second person 
should be someone with enough technical background to know if a system change is 
necessary. Administrators should not be authorized to make or modify backups, 
reconfigure the network, install software on critical systems, create new users, or do other 
major changes on their own. While this does increase the work to make such changes, it 
can considerably reduce the chances of a security incident. It also helps to separate duties 
properly, so no one audits a system they otherwise control (CERT Software Engineering 
Institute, 2018). Other measures that could detect some ideological threats are similar to 
foreign influence or espionage, including host-based employee monitoring. 
4. Deterring Ego-based Motivation 
Disgruntlement, ingratiation, and self-importance are motivators that can be 
difficult to deter but more easily detectable. Disgruntlement has been cited as a major 
motivator of information-technology sabotage. Deterring a disgruntled employee is 
unlikely, but such employees are made through a series of events that may be controllable. 
De-escalation techniques could reduce feelings of disgruntlement. Otherwise, 
disgruntlement could be detected through host-based user-behavior monitoring and 
community-behavior monitoring. User-behavior profiling can identify preparatory 
behavior to more serious acts; community-behavior profiling can help identify outliers to 
what is considered normal for a group of people, such as accountants. Obvious outliers 
from community behavior are usage outside of normal business hours and printing or 
downloading large numbers of documents. Other outlying behaviors could be sending more 
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emails outside the organization or downloading extensively from the Internet. Identifying 
outliers in individual behavior is more difficult, but some work associated Facebook “likes” 
with identifying depression, impulsivity, and life satisfaction with insider threats (Youyou 
et al., 2015). Some studies further support looking into personality traits because malicious 
insider threats show these traits in a higher proportion than in the general population (Liang 
et al., 2016). However, this study extracted feature keywords that may not have been 
observable until after the incident occurred. Some suggest that it is not these traits but how 
the individual handles personal failure that creates an insider threat (Charney, 2010). Some 
possibly observable traits are predatory behavior, personal or work-related conflicts, and 
problems with financial status. Interestingly, insiders also had more positive traits such as 
being agreeable, professional, and dedicated to family or work (Liang et al., 2016). 
Community-based models could reduce false positives with insider threats by 
allowing wider tolerance of day-to-day changes that may affect many employees, such as 
an increased file accesses due to an upcoming audit. Clustering similar behavior instead of 
roles is better for finding anomalous activity. Even if insider threats only spend a small 
fraction of their time committing crimes, this activity should stand out when compared 
against normal activity (Azaria et al., 2014; Dean, 2017). Reducing the damage that a 
disgruntled employee can cause also requires enforcement of the principle of least 
privilege. Privileged access management, segregation of duties, and two-person integrity 
should help to reduce the overall damage that a single insider threat could cause. Also, it 
is important to ensure that accounts from terminated employees are no longer active and 
the employees lack remote-access capability. 
Motivators of ingratiation or self-importance cannot be easily influenced and would 
be difficult to detect. Detection of ingratiation may be possible with social network analysis 
(SNA) to determine relationships between users. In particular could detect people that were 
not expected to have much two-way correspondence, such as a sales employee talking to 
someone in finance. These are weak clues; however, over time, a person who does much 
ingratiation can become disgruntled by feeling like they are not being recognized or 
appreciated. 
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Misuse of authorized access is harder to recognize. Special procedures will be 
needed for auditing it. These policy implementation measures do create an added workload 
for administrators to properly configure and audit regularly. Table 3 summarizes the 
motivations by which an insider threat could be deterred or detected with the recommended 
method. 
Table 3.  Deterrence and Detectability of Insider Threats by 
Motivation 
Motivator Deterrable Detectable Detection Method 




?  Reporting/ User Behavior 
Analytics /Access 
Controls 
Ideological ×  User Behavior Analytics 
/Access Controls 
Disgruntlement   User Behavior Analytics 
/Access Controls 
Ingratiation × ? Social Network Analysis/ 
User Behavior Analytics 
Self-Importance ×  User Behavior Analytics 
 
C. LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED EMPLOYEE 
MONITORING 
Many tools and processes can monitor employee performance. More broadly called 
“people analytics”, these tools and processes raise legal and ethical issues. Employers may 
legally monitor employees through software within the scope of employment. “Within 
scope” is generally defined as 1) anything that can be seen as job-related, 2) disclosed to 
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the individual, 3) not genetic information, 4) does not include surveillance of employees at 
personal locations away from work, and 5) is not judged as a “highly offensive” intrusion 
into their personal lives (Bodie et al., 2016). 
A challenge with data collection on employees is the possibility of introducing bias 
prohibited by law against employees based on race, sex, religion, especially as defined in 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which includes mental health conditions 
(Tursunbayeva et al., 2021). Disclosing how employees are monitored and what 
information is collected is important for complying with many state-mandated regulations 
that prohibit intercepting communications without specific consent from an employee’s 
phone if the employee reasonably expected privacy (Bodie et al., 2016). This consent must 
be more than broad consent to monitoring forms, which may be insufficient when 
significant privacy breaches occur. Genetic information cannot be collected according to 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, and other laws prevent 
adverse employment actions against employees who do not participate in employee 
wellness programs. 
Employees can now be monitored in their personal spaces by keystroke logging, 
camera recording, microphone monitoring, and other methods to verify where and how 
they are working (Tursunbayeva et al., 2021). This now includes working from home, 
raising legal issues for determining what can be considered a “personal location” and what 
acceptable monitoring can be done. This includes the monitoring necessary for detecting 
insider threats. Other legal issues can occur if the organization aggregates data, but courts 
have generally found an aggregation of non-private information to be unproblematic 
(Bodie et al., 2016). Organizations should also prevent accidental disclosure of personal 
data due to improper protection, such as failing to limit access to employee resumes or 
background investigations. 
Increased employee monitoring can affect employees by reducing their 
performance, raising questions about employee protection from manipulation, and 
reducing job satisfaction. Ethical issues can occur in gaining employee trust for monitoring, 
avoiding coercive power in “at-will” employment states, and the lack of legal or ethical 
precedents for new monitoring technology (Tursunbayeva et al., 2021). In “at-will” 
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employment states, employers can terminate an employee at any time for any reason except 
for a few illegal reasons, such as racial discrimination. However, employees can show 
decreased productivity if the perception of surveillance reduces the trust in the organization 
(Catrantzos, 2012). Mistrust is further exacerbated when employees do not know what 
information is collected and why, and do not see the benefits of such monitoring. Consent 
for monitoring should be requested from employees, and organizations must be aware that 
it may be illegal if consent is a condition of employment. Overall, employee tolerance for 
electronic monitoring has increased over time and is more accepted the more transparent 
an organization is about what information they collect. 
Another issue with increased monitoring is that it affects job satisfaction even after 
increased pay (Holt et al., 2017). Low job satisfaction is a major cause of disgruntlement 
and possibly becoming an insider threat (Liang et al., 2016). It is important that an 
organization be transparent and fair about what is collected. This develops trust between 
the organization and the employee and gives the organization some feedback on possible 
legal issues in privacy law. Other recommendations are to ensure that all data collected is 
job-related, avoid keeping data no longer useful and avoid aggregating too much 
information about an employee. Organizations should also publish a policy about how long 
information is kept on terminated employees (Tursunbayeva et al., 2021). 
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V. RECOMMENDED METHODS AND POLICIES 
We recommend closer integration of policy and technical controls to deter or detect 
intentional insider threats. This includes security policies that are easy for users to 
understand and follow, consistent vetting and termination procedures, more automated 
configuration options for administrators, centralized aggregation of data, and insider-threat 
reporting standards. Figure 1 shows the recommended hierarchy for increasing the 
likelihood of deterring or detecting insider threat incidents. 
 
Figure 1. Hybrid Policy and Technical Control Hierarchy 
A. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Proper policy implementation and enforcement can address an insider threat’s 
motive and limit the insider’s opportunity to cause harm. Fair and easy-to-follow security 
policies positively correlate with higher employee satisfaction and increase the likelihood 
of following security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009). However, in one survey of health 
industry security personnel, 27% said their insider-threat management programs were 
informal or rarely enforced; 24.2% indicated they had no insider-threat management 
program at all (HIMSS, 2018). The lack of enforcement could also be due to a lack of 
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formalized policies for handling insider threat incidents. Such policies could deter insider 
threat activity by demonstrating that even minor incidents, such as a policy infraction, are 
detected and enforced fairly. Consistent enforcement of these policies must prevent risky 
behavior from becoming the norm, as the social influence of peers and supervisors has a 
significant impact on employee security behaviors (Herath & Rao, 2009). 
For developing an insider-threat program, suggestions range from smaller quick-
fix guides to complete programs with checklists (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 
2018; Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020; NIST, 2020). One benefit of 
guides is that important security fundamentals are documented in writing, such as the 
principle of least privilege and proper access management. For smaller organizations with 
a limited capability to use most insider-threat tools mentioned later, a risk analysis of the 
most important incidents they wish to defend against and a review of tools in place to see 
if they can be configured may suffice. For example, existing network firewalls can be 
configured for content filtering to prevent proprietary data from being sent outside the 
organization. 
Enforcing policies is easier if employees want to comply. However, a common 
issue is a perception that complying with security policies unnecessarily hinders worker 
efficiency, especially in more flexible environments where employees hold multiple roles 
(Herath & Rao, 2009). Ideally, a good policy would communicate how simple actions can 
have a significant impact. For instance, an organization should look into alternatives to 
complex password policies that encourage users to write down their passwords. Two-factor 
authentication or personalized certificates would reduce an insider’s ability to steal 
credentials from co-workers. It could also reduce the ease of an administrator in creating 
fake accounts by requiring more resources to be allocated to the account. 
A policy that reduces an insider’s ability to commit crimes is proper termination 
procedures. Many insider-threat incidents occurred within 30 days of the insider leaving 
the organization. Some insiders showed warning signs before being terminated, and others 
had issues that should have been found during a pre-employment investigation. While 
thorough background investigations before employment are costly and time-consuming, 
monitoring behavior while a person is employed should be a routine security policy when 
29 
the cost of intellectual-property theft, fraud, or sabotage is significant. Monitoring around 
the time of termination, even if it were voluntary, is especially important to minimize risk 
to the organization and allow for possible prosecution. If the employer decides to provide, 
or is required by law to provide, a notice instead of immediate termination, remote access 
for that employee should be immediately disabled. In one review of 550 malicious 
information technology sabotage cases, 54% of the insiders did their attack using remote 
access tools, while 27% made their attack on-site (CERT Insider Threat Center, 2011). The 
most common protocols used by insiders were Secure Shell (SSH), Telnet, and Remote 
Desktop Protocol (RDP). 
Another consideration is that for proper implementation of security policies, the 
Human Resources department, the legal department, and employee supervisors must 
coordinate with the security team. They should also be continuously evaluating employees 
to monitor for sudden changes that might affect an employee’s likelihood of becoming an 
insider threat, such as major life events, repeated security violations, or unexplained 
affluence. Supervisors and Human Resources could reduce intentional insider threats by 
having formal and fair channels to resolve such work-related issues. One survey of 44 
insider incidents found 34 behavioral incidents before the insider’s attack (Claycomb et al., 
2013). In a larger study, 97% of insiders that committed information technology sabotage 
had indicative behavioral incidents that supervisors or co-workers knew about before the 
attack (Moore et al., 2012). 
B. TECHNICAL CONTROLS FOR INSIDER THREAT DETECTION OR 
DENIAL 
Technical controls such as user-behavior analytics, privileged-access management, 
auditing, and centralized aggregation allow organizations to deny or detect malicious 
insider threats. They primarily address an insider’s opportunity to commit a crime and 
increase the required technical capability.  
1. User Behavior Analytics for Employee Monitoring 
Behavioral monitoring can reduce the insider’s opportunity to attack by alerting 
anomalous behavior, including noticing preparatory behavior common before an attack. If 
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monitoring is clearly communicated to employees, it would also have a deterrent effect. 
Also, subverting behavioral monitoring tools would require an insider to have significant 
technical capability to disable or otherwise subvert the tool to go unnoticed. In a review of 
sabotage incidents, 90.9% of the cases had observable indicators before the attack, with an 
average of 5.4 separate events that involved both behavioral and technical events 
(Claycomb et al., 2013). Employee monitoring should be conducted by trained incident 
response employees who and the legal department should be involved to ensure no privacy 
laws are being broken. 
Employee monitoring includes data from system and network use. One major 
source is email, often used for data exfiltration when insiders steal information by sending 
attachments outside the organization (Gelles, 2016; Moore et al., 2012). For organizations 
in certain fields such as finance, housing, and sales, it is impractical to block all emails 
with attachments going outside of the organization; each organization must balance data 
protection and worker efficiency. However, indicators such as emailing outside of normal 
working hours or emailing many attachments should be flagged as abnormal and reviewed. 
Web sites should also be monitored.  Malicious sites and sites useful for data 
exfiltration that are not required for jobs, such as DropBox or Gmail, can be blacklisted 
and checked for. Some user-behavior tools can analyze a Web page’s topic and recognize 
suspicious topics such as violent extremism. 
Tracking of suspicious insider activities on workstations must go beyond anti-
malware tools. A variety of host-based sensors should be used. For a confirmed suspicious 
insider, host-based user-monitoring capabilities could be keystroke monitoring, 
applications monitoring (e.g., email, chat, data export, Web browser), screen captures, 
records of USB port activity, and records of file editing, and host logs such as security logs 
(Spooner et al., 2018). This information can be collected by an application installed on 
each user’s computer that sends the data back to a centralized location for analysis.  An 
organization’s servers can add information in logs of email, chat, printing, file transfers, 
and faxes. For instance, print servers log information on which user printed, which printer 
the job was sent, and the time the print request was sent. Indicators of anomalous behavior 
could be printing a large volume of sensitive material or repeated tries to access an 
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unauthorized file on a file server. Network-based sensors can log remote connections, 
email content, and Web browsing, although they may be unable to inspect encrypted 
content. 
Table 4 summarizes the types of logs that could be collected. These logs should be 
sent to the centralized logging system daily for analysis. Targeted monitoring should be 
used for users that have been flagged by the monitoring system. 
Table 4.  Possible Employee Monitoring Methods. Adapted and 
Extended from: Spooner et al. (2018). 
Type of 
Users Capability Client Server Network 
All users 
Applications 
executed by user X X
2 X2 
Chat content X X X3 
Document and 
file content for 
sensitive 
information 
X X X3 
Email content X X  
File access 
history X X  




Print logging X X X 
Remote-access 
logging X
1 X X 
Removable 
media activity X   
USB port activity X   
User behavioral 
analysis X X X 
Web browser 




X   
Logon and logoff 
information X
 X X 
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Type of 









cut, and paste) 
activity 
X   
Keystrokes X   
Screen capture of 
workstation 
display 
X   
X1: If using company-owned equipment. 
X2: If using Web-based application. 
X3: Less effective if encrypted. 
 
While collecting and analyzing all the data shown may be too costly for many 
organizations, a user-behavior analysis tool should try to report all obviously suspicious 
clues like copying many files. Not all malicious insider threats give much notice before 
their attack, as many suspicious clues are given less than one day before their attack 
(Claycomb et al., 2013). This suggests a need to integrate security staff with human 
resources and supervisors so that behavioral indicators can be correlated with online 
actions. Another recommendation is more automated options for configuring user behavior 
analytics tools to avoid errors. Many data-loss prevention tools offer autoconfiguration for 
checking compliance with policies such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS), 
or General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Other recommendations from the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology specify best security practices, but they are 
numerous and require careful implementation. Efforts should be made to automate this 
process further. 
Choosing thresholds for alerts and metrics on user behavior requires balancing the 
organization’s risk tolerance and acceptance of false positives. In establishing a threshold 
for a new employee, averages for the employee’s role may suffice until enough data about 
the employee is gathered to set baseline behaviors.  However, employees who perform the 
same role may not interact with the system in the same way. Community-behavioral 
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clustering allows for more tailored monitoring of an employee’s behavior and also allows 
flexibility for smaller organizations where employees have more than one role (Dean & 
Rowe, 2018). 
Several anomaly-based detection methods have been tested for insider-threat 
incident cases. Data required biased sampling because it contained many more normal than 
malicious users (Kim et al., 2019). Several methods showed promise using supervised, 
unsupervised, and semi-supervised machine-learning algorithms. Table 5 shows reported 
scores for various insider threat detection methods. SVM means “support-vector machine,” 
UBA means “user-behavior analytics,” CNN means “convolutional neural network,” RNN 
means “recurrent neural network,” and “LSTM” means long short-term memory recurrent 
neural network. 














CNN - - - 0.94 (Yuan & Wu, 2021) 
LTSM-




0.913* - 0.493* - (Le et al., 2019) 
Random 
Forest 0.796* - 0.902* - (Le et al., 2019) 






Naïve Bayes 0.6 - 0.3 - (Azaria et al., 2014) 
LSTM 
Auto-
encoder 0.91 0.098 - - 

















Forest 0.72 - - 0.76 (Gavai et al., 2015) 
LTSM-
Diag. 0.95 - -  (Tuor et al., 2017) 
Isolation 
Forest 0.96* - - 0.87* 
(Aldairi et al., 
2019) 
One-class 
SVM 0.99* - - 0.89* 









* Chose “daily” option for consistency, some better statistics were available for longer periods of 
observation. 
 
Supervised learning had generally higher precision and recall rates with enough 
data; however, it cannot identify new attack vectors and requires careful feature selection. 
Unsupervised learning offers more flexibility because it can be used to identify new 
anomalies. It is well-suited for real-time analysis and can have a high true-positive rate; 
however, it takes longer to run and can have a high initial false-positive rate. 
The most promising methods found for identifying insider threats used long short-
term memory (LSTM) and deep neural network (DNN) algorithms for supervised learning. 
Deep neural networks can automatically extract important combinations of features. Long 
short-term memory and convolutional neural networks (CNN) are particularly promising. 
On the CMU-CERT insider threat synthetic dataset version 4.2, one study claimed they 
could accurately detect insider threats with an area under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve (AUC) to 0.9449 (F. Yuan et al., 2018). On version 6.2 of the same 
dataset, several studies used a recurrent neural network (RNN), a generalization of an 
LSTM, to capture the features to predict a user's next action (Meng et al., 2018; Tuor et al., 
2017). The model performs better over time as more data is analyzed to know what is 
considered normal and performs similarly to the LSTM model, but they claim that the 
LSTM can better generalize despite sensitivity to weighted adjustments at the beginning of 
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training. Deep neural networks permit dynamic feature choices on highly imbalanced data. 
Supervised machine learning like neural networks needs labeled malicious behavior to train 
the model. Insider threat datasets are available, but few are publicly available, and most are 
synthetic, which can allow for important context-based events (i.e., the content of email 
messages) to be missed. Unsupervised deep learning could detect new threat methods, and 
the topic should be explored further. Unsupervised neural networks could recognize 
multivariate features automatically and learn historical trends to predict abnormal user 
behavior better.  
2. Privileged Access Management Monitoring 
System administrators that become insider threats pose more significant risks to 
organizations by their increased technical skill, expert knowledge of the system and 
monitoring capabilities, and the privileged access they already possess. Administrators and 
other privileged accounts should be monitored more closely than a regular employee, and 
there should always be more than one administrator for every critical system. Specific 
actions such as creating a backup, deleting a backup, and making network changes should 
require approval from several people. Proper separation of duties is also critical to reduce 
potential harm from sabotage (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 2018). Also, system 
administrators should not audit the systems they are responsible for. 
User behavioral monitoring of privileged users should send an immediate alert from 
the centralized system to a manager or other system administrator on suspicious actions. 
All privileged actions should be logged and sent to a centralized analysis system to look 
for misuse.  Privileged accounts should not be shared, and for temporary access, such as 
when a system developer needs to make an approved change, clear policies must be in 
place for how these instances are tracked.   
3. Auditing Requirements 
User access management, policy violations, and access control all require careful 
monitoring to identify vulnerabilities that could allow an insider-threat incident. User 
access management should be done at least quarterly to verify the absence of unauthorized 
(ghost) accounts and those of previously terminated employees. Logging should be done 
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automatically for account creations, changes, enabling, disabling, and removal. Especially 
vulnerable accounts can be recently created fake accounts, shared accounts, training 
accounts, and contractor accounts (CERT Software Engineering Institute, 2018; NIST, 
2020). 
Also, privileged access should be reviewed periodically to determine if an 
employee still needs that access. This applies to access controls on files and folders within 
an organization. Auditing should also record changes to access controls, including when 
file-access permissions have been delegated to non-administrators, such as a manager 
granting access to the accounting files to other employees. Auditing should verify that non-
technical incidents are recorded in the user-behavior analysis systems.  
4. Centralized Log Analysis and Correlation 
Centralized logging and timely analysis are essential for managing insider-threat 
activity. A dedicated server must be used since the computational requirements needed to 
perform this analysis will be time-consuming and must be running continuously in the 
background. Access to the server must be strictly managed. Security-incident and event 
management tools can visualize different anomaly detection methods such as user and role-
based activity, threshold or volume-based alerts, or new unidentified patterns and trends 
(Spooner et al., 2018). Key sources of information to be aggregated and analyzed are: 
• User-behavior anomalies or threshold violations. 
• Attempted and actual policy violations by users. 
• Network anomalies such as visiting suspicious websites, making abnormal 
remote connections, and attempting sensitive file exfiltration. 
• File access actions involving high-value assets as classified by data-loss 
prevention tools. 
• Print-server anomalies such as high-volume printing and printing material 
that violates access rights. 
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• Abnormal event sequences where a prohibited action is followed by an 
allowed action (such as a prohibited attempt to copy, followed by an 
allowed action of printing). 
Security-incident and event management tools require careful configuration and 
detailed rule tuning since the policy will vary between organizations. It will help to develop 
a “baseline” rule set for insider-threat detection analogous to a baseline rule set for 
intrusion detection. The system should have a user-friendly interface so that both technical 
and non-technical managers can use it to see high-priority alerts and take needed actions. 
Most security and event management systems allow customized priorities, but this 
capability should be audited regularly and require at least two administrators to change. 
Priorities can be assigned based on the severity of the action or the number of events 
involved. Examples of high-priority events are disabling of logging capabilities, abnormal 
remote access, unauthorized program download or attempted execution, attempted log 
modification, privilege escalation, repeated login attempts, or any significant user behavior 
alerts. High-priority events should require more than one person to approve the resolution. 
Some Automated responses can, in some cases, reduce the potential damage, such as 
automatic account locking or enablement of full log capture. 
A centralized correlation system should correlate events over multiple timeframes. 
Critical information in the form of alerts and correlations should be displayed quickly to 
allow time to respond, as after a meeting where the insider was denied a promotion 
(Claycomb et al., 2013). Most instances of insider-threat activity had indicators longer than 
24 hours, so a daily analysis schedule may be fine for most organizations. This allows for 
a granular view of changes in behavior daily and helps avoid missing key events since 
insiders generally will perform very few if any, malicious actions within a given day. 
Having only high-priority events alert immediately and other events correlate daily allows 
for an appropriate balance between computing requirements and timely security actions. 
Figure 2 summarizes our suggested system information flow. 
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Figure 2. Proposed Centralized System Information Flow 
5. Optional Controls 
Additional technical controls can be added for each organization on a case-by-case 
basis. In most cases, small changes can address insider-threat incidents with tools already 
in place. For instance, for data-loss protection, methods can detect discrepancies between user 
assigned sensitivity levels, and data loss prevention inferred sensitivity levels (Kongsgård et al., 
2017). Manual classification can be time-consuming and is prone to user-error; this method was 
meant to act as an indicator that employees were incorrectly classifying documents. This method 
used a dataset from the Digital National Security Archive to train a classifier using regression to 
distinguish between critical and non-critical documents with an overall accuracy of 0.84. This 
method also accounts for attempts at manipulating the system to classify new material 
improperly. An insider may still go undetected if their actions mimic normal employee actions. 
However, misclassification can still be a risk to an organization and should be audited for 
consistency by a manual review of a subset of documents. This prevents an automated 
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classification system from introducing errors into the pool of documents used to refine training. 
Also, new types of data that the data-loss prevention tool has not seen before may require manual 
classification with confirmation to avoid misclassification of new material. Misclassification can 
occur for new intellectual-property documents or by user-error. Some data-loss prevention tools 
can also move data stored in an improper location to the correct location and securely deleting 
the improperly stored version (Spooner et al., 2018). Data-loss prevention tools should be used 
when access control is insufficiently detailed or the cost of data leakage is high. 
Honeypots or honeytokens are a novel way to identify potential insider threats that 
open, copy, download, email sensitive information, or try to do so. A honeypot is a 
computer or system designed to act as a trap for attackers to target instead of an 
organization’s actual system. A honeytoken is similar, except instead of a computer, it can 
be a file or a fake login and password. Honeypots and honeytokens do require careful 
design so that the deceptive method is believable, easily visible, protected against 
sophisticated disabling, enticing to any potential insider, and not interfering with normal 
user activity. Common types of enticing data are login account information, financial 
information, social security numbers, and seemingly proprietary information. Honeytokens 
can act as a beacon or redirect an insider to a honeypot or honeynet with more tempting 
information to see if they exploit it (Spitzner, 2003). Creating and deploying honeytokens 
can be done automatically (Bowen et al., 2009). Software-based decoys can automatically 
generate bait software (Park & Stolfo, 2012). Honeytokens on user systems can help detect 
a masquerade attack, but this is prone to false positives with large numbers of bait files 
(Salem & Stolfo, 2011). Honeypot implementation does add more layers to be managed by 
the security team, and they may interfere with normal user activity. If such deceptions are 
already in place to protect against potential outside attacks, they can also help with insider-
threat detection. 
C. THE NEED FOR REAL-WORLD DATA 
Many tools and models mentioned here were evaluated on a few synthetically 
created datasets and small-group discussions. More real-world data is needed on how 
intentional insiders are subverting controls and which controls are the best in detecting 
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them. A centralized agency should collect this information for both the federal and private 
sectors. It should be anonymized to encourage businesses and government organizations 
to provide data and to reduce possible privacy concerns. Reporting and sharing insider-
threat data should also be made easy for organizations to do, so they will not just fire the 
insider and fail to offer lessons learned. 
The most popular dataset used in evaluating insider-threat detection is the CMU-
CERT insider-threat dataset. It was synthetically created to simulate five scenarios in a 
fictional company. The five scenarios were: 
1. A user who did not previously use removable drives or work after hours 
began logging in after-hours using a removable drive and uploading data 
to wikileaks.org. The user leaves the organization shortly afterwards. 
2. A user surfs a job website and solicits employment from a competitor. 
Before leaving the company, they use a thumb drive extensively to steal 
data. 
3. A system administrator becomes disgruntled. They download a keylogger 
and use a thumb drive to install it on their supervisor's machine. They use 
the collected key logs to steal the supervisor's password and send out an 
alarming mass email under the supervisor’s name, causing panic in the 
organization. The system administrator leaves the organization 
immediately. 
4. A user steals a password, logs into another user's machine, searches for 
interesting files, and emails what they find to their home email address. 
This behavior occurs more frequently over three months. 
5. A member of a group with many layoffs uploads documents to Dropbox, 
planning to use them for personal gain. 
Such synthetic data can be valuable in the testing of methods and tools. However, 
these scenarios given are well-known and smart insiders may expect the clues involved 
will be monitored in most organizations. Another issue with the CMU-CERT dataset is that 
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all email, Web pages, and other text content were randomized. This makes it impossible to 
discern topics of interest or do sentiment analysis which can show early indicators of 
disgruntlement.  The data also appeared quite “clean” even when inconsistencies were 
artificially introduced (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013). It would be desirable to get real-world 
data as well for study. While privacy issues can arise with using de-identified data, more 
information about how a malicious insider threat behaves over time is valuable in 
developing models. Anonymized data of real-world incidents, though rare, could provide 
a different kind of data to significantly increase our understanding of insider threats. 
D. CASE STUDY EXAMPLE 
In April 2020, at the start of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, Christopher 
Dobbins disrupted shipments of critical medical personal-protective equipment. He was 
sentenced a few months later in July to federal prison for causing more than $200,000 in 
damages from destroying 2,371 electronic shipping records and editing 115,581 shipping 
records (U.S. Attorney Northern District of Georgia, 2020). Mr. Dobbins had administrator 
access to the organizations’ systems and sabotaged the system after he was terminated. He 
used a fictitious user account he had made while still employed. After he had successfully 
altered or deleted shipping records, he deactivated his fake user accounts and logged out 
of the system. Privileged-access management tools would have caught the creation of new 
fake accounts and, if two-person authorization were in place, he could not have made so 
many fake accounts unnoticed. Also, if the organization had implemented the principle of 
least privilege, a regular user account should not have accessed that many shipping records. 
Also, a new administrator account should have been flagged. Probably the most helpful 
would have been increased employee monitoring before and after termination to look for 
anomalous activity and things like the creation of fake user accounts. 
E. INSIDER THREAT REPORTING 
Insider threat reporting comes from internal, external, or national sources. A 
recommendation for internal reporting is to use fellow employees more to notice negligent 
employees or intentional insiders. Many insider threats show suspicious behavior before 
the attack that is not detectable by technical means. However, relying upon other 
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employees to report suspicious behavior is difficult without a private or anonymous way 
to do so (Collins et al., 2016). One solution is to provide a third-party hotline to report 
incidents, so employees can report higher authority personnel, such as managers, without 
fear of reprisal. Of course, internal reporting benefits from close integration between 
security personnel, human resources, management, and the legal department.   
Organizations should try to build trusted relationships with other organizations to 
share insider-threat information, building on their other information sharing (Wagner et al., 
2019). Even though manual sharing is widely used, 44% of organizations surveyed 
reported that slow or manual processes impeded threat intelligence sharing, and 37% 
reported that it kept them from sharing at all (see Figure 3). It helps to automate some 
information sharing for cross-organizational coordination, though full automation can risk 
accidental spillage of protected information (Cichonski et al., 2012). Figure 3 shows some 
reasons why organizations chose not to share threat intelligence. While this is for all types 
of threat intelligence, these same issues occur for insider-threat sharing. While this is for 






Figure 3. Reasons for Not Sharing Threat Intelligence. Source: Ponemon 
Institute LLC (2018). 
Insider threat data sharing should also be handled at a national level. On May 12, 
2021, the White House issued an executive order requiring information-technology and 
operational-technology service providers contracted by the federal government to share 
threat information (Exec. Order No. 14028, 2021). The order is meant to reduce the 
difficulty of sharing information between the federal government and the private sector. 
Similar coordination should be made for organizations that do not fall under this 
requirement. This would encourage the development and streamlined anonymization of 
real-world data and would greatly help the development of intent-based behavioral 
monitoring. Companies can be incentivized to share information by being able to receive 
intelligence threat information from other organizations, thus reducing their need for 
privatized solutions. 
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Our proposed countermeasures for insider threats are summarized in Table 6. An 
organization should first focus on low-cost measures that enable proper enforcement and 
provide a basis for more complex activities. Policy implementation is the most critical, 
followed by technical controls, then reporting. 
Table 6.  Summary of Insider Threat Enabler and Recommended 
Method for Mitigation or Detection 
 Motive Opportunity Capability 
Policy    
User behavior 
analytics    
Privileged-access 
management    




   
Threat reporting    
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The policy of deterring first then detecting is not new for countering intentional 
insider threats but must be planned carefully. Using ideas from deterrence models for 
security policy compliance with modern technological controls, the chances of being 
caught are high for insiders. However, deterrence effectiveness cannot be adequately 
evaluated without better real-world data on insider threats. 
Overall, deter-then-detect should be straightforward for organizations to implement 
because most deterrence can be accomplished through a few monitoring capabilities and 
policy enforcement. The challenges are primarily in security implementation. Insider 
threats are a rising problem, with 68% of organizations surveyed by Ponemon Institute 
saying they observed more frequent insider attacks over the last 12 months; the number of 
incidents reported has tripled since 2016 (IBM Security, 2020). The average annual cost of 
handling malicious insiders or credential theft was $6.87 million per organization in 204 
organizations surveyed across 13 industry sectors. Robust policies and modern technical 
controls are definitely recommended. 
We also need more studies on intentional insider threats. Hundreds of studies are 
available on handling insider threats, but they focus either on the psychological side or the 
technical side alone. We noted a lack of discussion about whether insider threats are 
increasing enough to need increased investment. However, we believe that many tools 
discussed here would help protect an organization against insider threats. 
Future work on insider threats should focus on improving detection tools using real-
world data of insider-threat incidents, particularly long short-term memory models.  
Additional work could focus on comparing the different LSTM models against each other 
to find the most efficient model when comparing overall recall and precision against the 
number of extracted features required. Another recommendation is to focus more on 
combining psychological and technical techniques. A combined study with representatives 
from both disciplines developing tools and studying how they influence user behavior 
would help. 
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